Trace the evolution of non-proliferation policy bringing out the main features of the non-proliferation regime.

                 Non-proliferation policy has been constantly evolving to meet the international scenario’s requirements. The common strand connecting the policy’s evolution is its desire to restrict and limit the number of nuclear weapon states. The weapon states have tried constantly to deprive the non-weapon states from acquiring them. There can be four distinct stages recognized in the evolution of   non-proliferation proliferation policy. They are i) US monopoly  ii) Atoms for peace  iii) Safeguards regime   iv) Reactive phase.

                 Initially, United States (US) tried to hold on to its monopoly of nuclear technology. The Quebec Agreement of 1943 between US, Britain and Canada prohibited knowledge sharing with third party without mutual consent. Russia was left out deliberately from the advancements of nuclear technology. Russia soon asserted itself with nuclear testing in 1949. Britain and France too followed in quick successions, although for varying necessities.

                 Various reports concluded that the hold of US monopoly would not be feasible and it was necessary to institute a rules based safeguard regime to prevent proliferation. US president, Eisenhower announced the ‘Atoms for peace’ program in UN in 1953. The ‘liberal policy’ envisaged the sharing of peaceful uses of nuclear technology with safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was constituted with a body of experts to be responsible for storage and security of fissile material.

                 China’s nuclear explosion of 1964 opened up a new dimension in the security dilemma. Hitherto, all discursions were based on technological frameworks and strategic discussions. The Chinese explosion, one by a third world poor country focused the attention on diversion from the peaceful uses to military application.

                 P5(US ,UK , France, Russia, China) the permanent members of UN Security Council had all acquired  nuclear power status by 1964 .They wanted to prevent the further acquisition of weapon by other nations. Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968. It recognized the states that had acquired nuclear weapons before 1 January 1967 as weapon states.

                 Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 brought back the focus on diversion. Nuclear technology being dual-use was dependant on the political will on whether to pursue military dimension. The Indian explosion motivated many nations to join NPT. They assured to take steps to prevent proliferation.

                 The safeguards regime has since then expanded with various initiatives such as Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, constitution of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) , indefinite extension of NPT in 1995, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Wassenar  Arrangement on export controls, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), IAEA inspection and verification to prevent and detect diversion of fissile materials.

                 The current nuclear policy relies on safeguards and sanctions to prevent any nation from acquiring nuclear weapons. One of the necessities for acquiring weapons is technological knowledge. This has been acquired even from the peaceful uses applications. The other need is sufficient quantity of highly enriched fissile material. Nations have to agree to strict inspections and verifications by IAEA. It keeps tab on the amount of enriched fissile material and prevents and detects diversions. The ‘peaceful uses’ of nuclear technology were defined and monitored to check any military applications.

                 Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) adopted the guidelines for Transfer of Nuclear Related Dual-Use equipments material and Related Technology in 1992. It envisages the transfer of sensitive technologies under a safeguards system. The recipients pledged not to use the transferred material for nuclear explosions of any kind.

                 MTCR aims to restrict the knowledge about missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Wassenar arrangement on export control prohibits and prescribes the terms on which nations can export nuclear technology and fissile material.  

                 The NPT discrimination of nuclear haves and have-not has stood its ground. Despite, Indian and Pakistani nuclear explosions in 1998, they are not recognized as nuclear weapon states. India has got itself integrated into the global nuclear setup   by US assistance. A special NSG waiver has allowed India the position of a de facto NPT weapon state despite India’s steadfast refusal to sign NPT (which India views as discriminatory and focusing only on horizontal proliferation and neglecting vertical proliferation).

                 The Comprehensive Test Ban treaty (1996) has aimed at tackling both horizontal and vertical proliferation by banning all nuclear explosions. It aims to     (i) end the development of new and advanced nuclear weapons (ii) constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons (iii) contribute to nuclear proliferation and disarmament. (iv) Strengthen International peace and security.

                 CTBT has allowed cub-critical explosions and continuation of lab level testing. There is apprehension that developed nations can use simulations and programs to test and develop advanced weapons based on data acquired from prior explosions.      

                 FMCT aims to reduce the stockpile of fissile materials. It has also envisaged a reduction of the stockpile. It is perceived as a logical next step of SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) and denuclearization efforts. Along with START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) they may be able to achieve nuclear disarmament.

                 The AQ Khan network caused irreparable damage to the cause of nuclear proliferation. AQ Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist went rouge and supplied nuclear know-how’s and equipments in the black market. This network is considered responsible for the advancement of Iran and North Korea to the level of acquiring nuclear weapons.

                 The current nuclear setup is P5 dominated and directed. IAEA has led the steps to keep nuclear weapons out of reach by safeguards and inspections. All steps taken by P5 have been to reduce proliferation and less attention have been paid to disarmament. The security dilemma and motivation for nations to go nuclear have been ignored.

                 The North Korean nuclear explosions have brought to fore the dichotomies  and dilemmas regarding non-proliferation. Also, the rise of non state actors such as Islamic state (IS) has increased the uncertainty surrounding nuclear policy. The situation   if a nuclear weapon is stolen or the explosion of a dirty bomb by terrorists can be catastrophic. The non-proliferation policy has to further evolve to meet the growing challenges and newly arisen threats.