Comment on India’s approach to multilateral disarmament with particular reference to Comprehensive Test Ban treaty.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened to signature in 1996. 183 countries have signed it. However, the requirement that nations categorized under Annex-2 (state with nuclear reactors and nuclear capable states) have to join the treaty in order for CTBT to come into force has prevented the treaty from coming into force. Among these, India, Pakistan and North Korea have not joined the treaty and few nations (CHINA, EGYPT, IRAN, ISRAEL and US) have not yet ratified it. Hence, despite majority of the nations signing CTBT, the treaty is yet to come to force.
India’s tryst with disarmament has been unrelenting and sincere, but its aspirations for a non-discriminatory treatment have hindered it from joining NPT and CTBT. It was India’s Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who gave the first call for a “standstill agreement” on nuclear testing in 1954. However, after protracted negotiations only a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was signed in 1963. PTBT prohibited testing of nuclear weapons in atmosphere and underwater. PTBT did not prohibit underground testing. The nuclear weapon states (NWS) felt that it was not possible to have a fool proof verification system to detect underground explosions. Moreover, China and France refused to join PTBT.
After the 1964 Chinese nuclear explosion and Chinese (diplomatic as well as material) support to Pakistan during the 1965 war, the strategic community started discussing the need for nuclear deterrence. In November 1965, India embarked on the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project (SNEP) code named Smiling Buddha.
In 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was opened for signature. India vehemently opposed the discriminatory nature of the treaty. The treaty recognized nations which had acquired nuclear capability prior to 1 Jan 1967 as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). The treaty had three elements a) non-proliferation b) disarmament c) peaceful use of nuclear technology. These three constitute the “grand bargain” between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. The treaty aims to achieve the following,
a) States without nuclear weapon will not acquire them
b) States with nuclear weapons will pursue disarmament.
c) All nations will be provided access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology albeit with safeguards.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has spearheaded the efforts to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and inhibit its use for any military purpose.
In 1974, India conducted a nuclear explosion, which it called as peaceful nuclear explosion. India did not conduct follow up tests and practiced self restraint. Consequent Indian Prime Ministers called for disarmament and were reluctant to embark on acquiring nuclear weapons. Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 put forward an action plan for multilateral time bound disarmament.
The indefinite extension of NPT in 1995 permanently segregated the world into nuclear haves and have not’s. The disarmament clause of NPT had seen little progress in this time period. In 1996, Conference on Disarmament India opposed the adoption of CTBT due to its discriminatory stand. India wowed that it will not sign the treaty stating, “Not now, not ever”.
India called for a universal disarmament. Its principled opposition was against the unequal and discriminatory nature of the nuclear regime that was being put into place. India also opposed the Entry- Into-Force (EIF) clause. The EIF clause stipulated 44 nations mandatory inclusion for the CTBT to come into force. India viewed this as compelling it into decision and infringing on its sovereignty.
The absence of prohibition of simulation testing and further development of advanced weapons by CTBT has caused suspicion that the NWS have acquired the capability to develop and test newer advanced weaponry by simulations without the need for an explosion.
The absence of a time bound disarmament arrangement has led to the doubt that the test ban would be an end in itself. An International Monitoring System under Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) with its network of sensors has been setup in orders to detect any nuclear tests.
In 1998, India conducted a series of nuclear tests and declared its nuclear weapon capability. Soon after the testing, India declared a unilateral moratorium on further testing. The compelling demands on the strategic front have been cited as necessitating the tests.
The fear of Pakistan acquiring nuclear technology as well as the need for acquiring Credible Minimum Deterrence on the nuclear front to deal with the rising insecurities in a hostile neighborhood are said to have guided Indian decisions.
Post acquiring nuclear capability, India has adopted a responsible and mature nuclear posture. India’s nuclear doctrine has adopted a No-First use policy and also promised to not use nuclear weapons against Non-nuclear weapon states.
India has favored the adoption of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) on a non-discriminatory basis. Negotiations are not yet finalized regarding FMCT.
Despite not joining CTBT, India is a defacto member of the treaty. It observes all the provisions of CTBT. Its self imposed moratorium along with its behavior as a responsible nuclear state yielded it international recognition. The Indo-US Nuclear Agreement of 2008 was an explicit recognition of Indian policy. India, in return for lifting the technological deprivation and civil nuclear co-operation agreed to separate all its civil and nuclear facilities and allowed for greater IEAE inspections. Nuclear suppliers Group (NSG) also provided for a special waiver to facilitate transfer of fissile material.
In 2016, India joined the Missile Control Technology Regime (MCTR) to further the aim of global non- proliferation. Indian commitment to disarmament has been unwavering provided all nations agree for a time bound global disarmament. The 1962 aggression by China and the threat of US intervention during 1971 crises in favor of Pakistan compelled India to opt for Nuclear deterrence for credible minimum deterrence.